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I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, proponents of the "law and economics" school of
jurisprudence have increasingly challenged the traditional theories of
2
property rights. Scholars such as Guido Calabresi,l Richard Epstein
Richard Posner and others 4 have proposed that the economic approach
*The author is in the Ph.D.-J.D. program at the University of Florida. This paper received the
Florida Political Science Association's award for the best graduate student paper in the state of
Florida, 1988. He expresses his appreciation to Professor Bert Swanson, Department of Political
Science, University of Florida, Marcie Guira, and Scott Makar for their helpful comments.
1. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970); Calabresi, About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 553 (1980).
2. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(1985).
3. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 29-78 (3d. ed. 1986).
4.

See, e.g., B.

ACKERMAN,

RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW

153

(1984).
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to law, characterized by a search for economically efficient and equitable decision rules, should be the cornerstone of adjudication in property rights cases. Attacking this approach, Laurence Tribe, 5 C. Phillip
Baker8 and others7 have suggested that the law and economics school
supplants sound legal analysis in favor of ideologically based decisionmaking.
Despite this scholarly criticism, the growing influence of the law
and economics school is unmistakable. All major centers of legal education have at least. one faculty member who specializes in law and
economics. 8 Concurrently, the federal judiciary has a small, but increasingly influential, group of conservative members whose jurisprudential leanings are grounded in many of the central tenets of the law
and economics movement. 9
This essay outlines the various attributes of law and economics
jurisprudence and applies these tenets to a proposed Alachua County
greenbelt plan. The essay's first section discusses the assumptions and
main themes of the law and economics school of thought. This section
develops the theoretical underpinnings that economists use to analyze
legal issues. The second section analyzes the policy implications of the
law and economics approach and its application to an Alachua County
Greenbelt Proposal.1° The paper concludes with a brief summary of
the essay's primary findings.

II.

THE LAW AND ECONOMICS SCHOOL

A.

The School's Genesis

This section broadly defines the major elements of "law and
economics" theory. The roots of the law and economics school have
5. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES vii-viii (1985).
6. Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 3 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS, 32,
32-41 (1975).
7.

See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE ch. 12-13 (1985) (challenging wealth

maximization and efficiency); Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism,
60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974) (expressing concerns about the law and economics movement).
8. See generally The Place of Economics in Legal Education, 33 J.LEGAL EDUC. 183
(1983) (symposium on the law and economics movement and its role in legal education).

9.

See Barrett, A Movement Called "Law and Economics" Sways Legal Circles, Wall St. J.,

Aug. 4, 1986 at 1, col. 1.
10. See J. Hall, The Proposed Western Greenbelt Strategies and Strategy Outline, The

Alachua County Greenbelt Task Force, Gainesville, Florida, (December 8, 1987) [hereinafter
Greenbelt Proposal]. Mr. Hall is a consulting planner for the Task Force. Although two other
proposals have been submitted to the Alachua County Greenbelt Task Force, this essay examines
the Hall Greenbelt Proposal because of its relatively moderate stance toward development.
Because of the Proposal's intermediate stance, Alachua County is much more likely to implement
the Hall Greenbelt Proposal instead of the competing plans. See also Hamilton, Greenbelt on
Fringes of Reality, The Gainesville Sun, January 24, 1988, at B1, col. 2.
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emerged, in part, from various schools of property rights theory." By
the 1960s, a number of scholars had systematically applied economic
thinking to antitrust, taxation, and corporate law. But according to
Posner, it was not until the publication of two articles, one by Ronald
was set for
Coase, 12 the other by Guido Calabresi, 3 that the agenda
14
a broader application of economic principles to law.
There are two conflicting visions in the economic analysis of law.
Posner's view is that the exclusive goal of law and economics should
be efficient legal rules that lead to wealth maximization.1 In contrast,
Mitchell Polinsky argues that efficiency should be the primary goal of
the law and economics school but not the exclusive goal. 16 Polinsky
believes that equity considerations should also influence legal decisionmaking. Because most law and economics property rights theorists
take into account both efficiency and equity, this essay considers both
values.
There are several problems with the law and economics approach.
One problem is that the dual goals of efficiency and equity can not

11. See G. BJORK, LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY: THE ECONOMICS OF LAND-USE
PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS (1982). Bjork classifies property rights theorists
into three schools: social contract/utilitarian, psychological, and personalist. Social contract/
utilitarians view property rights as functions of social creations; psychological theorists emphasize
the need for stable expectations; and personalists stress that property rights are derivations of

an individual's exercise of liberty (i.e. personal creation). See also Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1165-1258 (1967). Michelman uses three categories: desert/personalist, social functionary,
and utilitarian. Desert theorists justify property rights on merit and share the philosophical
concern of personalist theorists that production should not be considered an end in itself. Id.
at 1203-05. Social functionary theorists are oriented towards maximizing production while utilitarian theorists concern themselves with stable expectations. Id. at 1206-13. Contemporary law
and economics scholars borrow concepts from several of these schools. For example, Richard
Posner's writings exhibit desert, utilitarian, psychological, and personalist tendencies. Arguably,
he is more a desert theorist than anything else.
12. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
13. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 20 YALE L.J.
499 (1961).

14. See R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 19. See also Gjerdingen, The Coase Theorem and the
Psychology of Common Law Thought, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 711 (1983) (discussion of how the
Coasean framework has affected legal thought particularly in property rights disputes). Earlier
scholars such as A.C. Pigou had tried to broaden the agenda, but were largely unsuccessful.
See A. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1932).
15. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 15.
16. A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS xiv (1981). Polinsky's
book adopts the normative (prescriptive), rather than positive (descriptive), approach towards
economic analysis.
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always be reconciled. 17 There is also the additional dilemma of transferring the theories of the economist to the realm of the marketplace.
Simplifying assumptions necessary to build theoretical models are
sometimes inadequate reflections of society. Yet, law and economics
scholars have made important contributions by developing a structured
analysis of legal mechanisms.,
B.

Efficiency Versus Equity

Efficiency and equity have very precise definitions in the law and
economics literature. Efficiency refers to the relationship between an
action's marginal benefits and marginal costs; if the marginal benefits
exceed marginal costs, the action should be undertaken. 19 Equity refers
to the distribution of income among individuals.20 Lawyers and
philosophers, however, interpret both of these terms quite differently
from economists. Because these terms form the foundation for the
central premise of economic analysis of law, a more detailed explanation is required.
The concept of efficiency that economists use refers to Pareto efficiency (or optimality). A situation is Pareto efficient if there is no
change in the allocation of resources that can make someone better
off without making someone else worse off.21 A related situation is
where the winner in a transaction could compensate the loser making
both better off.- The key element is that participants are left either
better off or no worse off than before the reallocation of resources.
In general, the economists' definition of equity does not refer to
the process by which wealth or income is transferred. 2 Instead,

17.

See generally J.

RAWLS,

A

THEORY OF JUSTICE

3 (1971) (laws and institutions, no

matter how efficient, must be abolished if they are unjust).
18. The law and economics school operates under five major assumptions. See generally A.
POLINSKY, supra note 16, at 2-4. The first is consumer sovereignty. This concept means that
individuals themselves determine the dollar value of benefits and costs. Second, the school
assumes that benefits and costs can be satisfactorily measured. Third, individual values are
presumably "stable" and not readily affected by public policy. Fourth, individuals have exogenous
personal preferences independent of legal rules. Fifth, individuals attempt to maximize their
own well-being (utility).
19. See A. POLINSKY, supra note 16, at 7.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1-11.
22. Id. at 1-4. This situation is an example of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency which is also termed
the condition of "potential Pareto superiority." See Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare
Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939). See also Scitovsky, A Note on Welfare
Propositions in Economics, 9 REv. ECON. STUD. 77 (1941).
23. A. POLINSKY, supra note 16, at 3-7.
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economists define equity either in terms of the final distribution of
income or the degree to which property rights are upheld. Economists'
concerns with equitable distributions of income relate to each individual
receiving that amount of income proportionate to their respective interests. A second meaning associated with equity regards fair "process." Concerns over governmental enforcement of property rights is
an example. Equity in this sense requires that the process of acquisition and transfer of property is fair.- Whether income distribution
is equitable or not is a secondary concern.
C.

Entitlements

The conflict between efficiency and equity requires a resolution
mechanism. Typically, a multi-step process results. First, a determi26
nation is made regarding which party has the right to an entitlement.
Next, a decision is made regarding how to protect this right. The
person holding the entitlement seeks a remedy, such as an injunction
or award of damages, to prevent or recompense a loss of the entitlement. Each of these remedies, however, has certain drawbacks that
may make one approach superior to the other.
A major problem under the injunctive remedy is strategic behavior.
In economic terms, strategic behavior refers to a technique negotiators
use to raise the stakes resulting in a less than efficient outcome. This
problem can be alleviated if there is an intermediate, instead of an
absolute, entitlement. Thus, the choice of entitlement will determine
who has the right to undertake a particular activity (such as pollution)
and what rights others will have to prevent the activity. An absolute
entitlement to pollute is the right to pollute regardless of the costs
imposed on others. Faced with an absolute entitlement to pollute,
adversely affected parties have two recourses. They can either
negotiate with the polluter and pay him to reduce his pollution, or
attempt to change the absolute entitlement to an intermediate entitlement where a judicial or legislative body sets the permissible level of
pollution. A preferred solution, therefore, could be the initial assignment of an intermediate entitlement that minimizes litigation and nego-

24. Id. at 7.
25. See id. See also R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 96-108 (1974).
26. Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed observed that the first task of any legal order
is to design a system of entitlements. Entitlements refer to the question of to whom does the
government rule in favor of when the government must resolve the conflicting interests of two
parties. The legal rule the government adopts is the entitlement. See Calabresi & Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1089 (1972).
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tiation costs. An intermediate entitlement also reduces the parties'
incentive to engage in strategic behavior because the entitlement reduces the scope of their dispute.
Another problem is that legal disputants may not wish to settle
cases based on their perception of the situation. For example, one
party to a dispute may feel that by stubborn bargaining he can overwhelm the opponent. This situation is known as "extortion" or the
"hold out" problem. In these instances, one party has a strong incentive
to hold out if he can increase his individual payoff. This problem is
the reason proponents of the law and economics school suggest that
liability be equal to actual damages. Recovery of actual damages is
the efficient outcome and limits the likelihood of strategic behavior
under the damages remedy.There are two other important considerations, risk-bearing and
incentives, that economists take into account in determining the efficient outcome.A Legal rules should allocate risk to eliminate or reduce
moral hazards. A moral hazard is a situation in which the actor has
a reduced incentive to exercise care.2 This behavior results in inefficiency (i.e. negligence) unless the actor is bearing an efficient allocation
of risk. The provision of incentives or sanctions can encourage an
efficient activity level. For example, a city can seek the efficient level
of parking infractions. If there are too many parking infractions, the
city may either make sanctions more severe or increase the quantity
of citations.
D.

The Coase Theorem
Professor Ronald Coase's seminal article, The Problem of Social
Cost, is perhaps the most important contribution to law and economics
reasoning0 The article's major contribution is the development of the
Coase theorem which states that if transactions are costless, the initial
assignment of a property right does not necessarily determine the
property's ultimate use. Conversely, positive transaction costs may
prevent the efficient outcome from occurring. In these cases, the preferred legal rule is the rule that minimizes the economic effects of
transaction costs. These effects include the actual incidence of transaction costs and the inefficient choices induced when individuals at-

27. See A. POLINSKY, supra note 16, at 11-22.
28. Id. at 105-26.
29. See R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 150.
30. See Coase, supranote 12. See also R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 19-26 (general discussion
of Coase's contributions).
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tempt to to avoid transaction costs. The Coase theorem illustrates,
for example, the concept that the transactions costs of redistributing
income may be so high that inefficient rules would have to be selected
in order to effect such a social policy. The Coase theorem has direct
application to greenbelt legislation because changes in zoning regulations may redistribute wealth among affected property owners. The
Coasean paradigm states that the reshuffling of property rights following the implementation of greenbelt legislation may lead to inefficiency
depending on the level of transactions costs.3 1
E.

Criticisms of the School

A number of scholars have criticized the law and economics school's
approach to constitutional issues.m There are two common interrelated
criticisms. First, the law and economics movement reduces complex
phenomena to the narrow criteria of efficiency and equity without
considering other social values. The result is an impoverished analysis
which excludes much of the history of the common law.3 Professor
Laurence Tribe's argues that legal decision-making should not rely
upon any one single over-arching standard.Y In addition, he views the
law and economics movement as excessively ideological.A second criticism is that efficiency does not equal justice. For
instance, Posner equates justice with wealth-maximization, a view
many commentators have critiqued.- Because of this intense debate,
law and economics theorists have focused attention on important as-

31. See infra § IV(B).
32. See supra notes 5-7. Cf. Posner, The Law and Economics Movement, 77 AM. ECON.
REV. 1 (No. 2 1987) (application of law and economics to free speech and religion).
33. See Leff, supra note 7, at 451. This criticism is directed primarily towards the positivistic
claims of the economists supporting the law and economics movement such as Professors Gary
Becker and George Stigler. See Becker & Stigler, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM.
ECON. REV. 76 (1977). Professor Ackerman notes that Posner, an "efficiency-minded lawyer,"
is the first scholar to realize that efficiency requires a normative defense to be a social value.
See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 144-46.
34. L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 1-8.
35. Phillip Baker made this point as well in one of his prominent articles. See Baker, supra
note 6, at 32-41.
36. See R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 88-115 (1983).
37. Critiquing Posner's pioneering and prolific law and economics scholarship is an international cottage industry. For an overview of "Posnerism" see Coleman, The Normative Basis of
Economic Analysis: A CriticalReview of Richard Posner's The Economics of Justice, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 1105 (1982); Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); Kronman,
Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1980); Posner, The
Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1980).
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pects of questions that were previously obscured. Due to their
methodology, they have not only improved the tools of analysis, but
altered the character of the debate over legal principles.
III.

THE PROPOSED ALACHUA COUNTY GREENBELT PLAN

An Alachua County greenbelt plan is the subject of continuing
controversy. The focus of debate is the greenbelt strategy for the western part of Alachua County, Florida. Under the proposed plan, three
distinct land use classifications would undergird all other zoning and
land use classifications. This section discusses the main elements of
the Greenbelt Proposal. The following section then analyzes the Greenbelt Proposal concentrating on hypothetical situations that involve
potential legal actions property owners might assert. In particular,
the analysis of each situation using the perspective of law and
economics property rights theorists suggests efficient and equitable
solutions.
A.

Key Elements of the Greenbelt Proposal

The Greenbelt Proposal contains three distinct zone classifications
represented in Figure 1. The first classification is an inner urban zone
represented by the dark shaded area in the county's center. This
urban area is bordered on its outer perimeter by the Greenbelt zone
represented by the light shaded area (including Kanapaha Prairie and
the Blues Creek, East Newnans Lake, and Prairie Creek systems).
This Greenbelt zone is, in turn, bordered on its outside by a rural
zone, which is unshaded. The outer rural zone has the most stringent
development restrictions.The Greenbelt Proposal's first major element is an urban defining
limit between two of the area's primary natural preserves.3 9 Inside
this limit is an urban zone which has the highest population density
allowance. Urban zone "activity centers" are the locus of increased
development. The greatest permissible density within the urban zone
is in the areas around these activity centers. The urban defining limit
also incorporates an area of land in the proposed Greenbelt area.
Under the Greenbelt Proposal, the Greenbelt zone should include vacant areas of land. Density requirements in excess of the current resi-

38. See Greenbelt Proposal, § II(A)-(D).
39. This zone is between San Felasco Hammock State Preserve and Kanapaha Prairie. See
Greenbelt Proposal, § I(A)-(F).
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the
dential density corridors would be encouraged. The area beyond
40
urban defining limit would be classified as the rural zone.
The second major element in the Greenbelt Proposal is the implementation of a rural land classification system. 41 Under this scheme,
density restrictions limit one dwelling unit per five acre tract. The
only exception to this density requirement are cluster rural sub-divisions that allow one dwelling unit per acre coupled with stringent
design restrictions. These restrictions should help maintain the rural
character of the land. There will also be more stringent development

40.
41.

Id. § II(A)-(D).
Id.
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regulations in all areas of the rural zone. For example, passing infrastructure development costs to the developer should provide a disincentive to development.The Greenbelt Proposal's third major element is a Greenbelt cluster
zone." This area, like the rural cluster zone, requires deep setbacks
from public right-of-ways.- The objective of both cluster classifications
is the preservation of the zone's rural character while allowing higher
density levels. The stringent design regulation in both cluster zones
also serves this purpose. The Greenbelt cluster zone, however, allows
increased density if a property owner meets additional requirements
for open space, public access to open space, extensions of agricultural
land use, and reforested land.
The Greenbelt Proposal has a number of potential problems. Presumably some property owners will be subject to new regulatory burdens such as zoning restrictions, impact fees, and other limits to development. Because the Greenbelt Proposal redistributes property rights
(and consequently wealth) it is critical that the county establish some
general principles upon which to assess this redistribution and its
alternatives. The primary legal issue that could arise is whether the
implementation of the Greenbelt Proposal results in a "taking" of private property requiring just compensation. The next section addresses
the takings and just compensation issues by presenting two scenarios
in which the law and economics theories would apply.
IV.

POLICY APPLICATONS

This section present two different situations that would arise under
the Greenbelt Proposal.- In each situation, a fictitious Alachua County

42. See, e.g., Baumon & Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Surtey of
American Practices, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (1987); Delaney, Gordon & Hess, The
Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test for Validating Subdivision Exactions, User Impact
Fees, and Linkage, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (1987); Nicholas, Impact Exactions:
Economic Theory, Practice,and Incidence, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85 (1987); Siemon, Who
Bears the Cost? Exactions: A ControversialNew Source for Municipal Funds, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115 (1987).

43.

Greenbelt Proposal, § III(A)-(G).

44.

Id.

45. This analysis of the Greenbelt Proposal relies upon the following assumptions: (1) green
space is a socially desirable public good; (2) there are circumstances in which the costs to
residents living adjacent to green space may outweigh the benefits; (3) private property may
have to be purchased for the plan to be fully executed; (4) access to the greenbelt may not
always be possible without going through private land; and (5) there will be extensive due
process on the proposed plan.
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resident, J.B. Mossback, is subject to various governmental actions
that interfere with his property interests. Each hypothetical addresses
the following three questions as they apply to stated facts: (1) What
causes of action, if any, would Mossback have in these situations? (2)
How would the law and economics approach apply to each of the
factual situations? (3) What would the judicial outcome be utilizing
applications of law and economics theory?
A.

Situation A - Just Compensation

A disgruntled resident of Alachua County, developer J.B.
Mossback, prefers urban living to country life. He also is a
strong believer in his own superior negotiation skills and
feels he can outlast any opponent who tries to outbargain
him. Mossback owns several pieces of property on the proposed greenbelt zone. He is strongly opposed to selling his
land to the county for use as a park. The county, however,
invokes its power of eminent domain and offers Mossback a
the county did not
settlement. Mossback sues and claims
' '4
provide him with "just compensation. 6
The analysis in this section relies on the contributions of three
property rights scholars: Frank Michelman, 47 Joseph Sax,4 and
Richard Epstein.49 Michelman states there are four factors that traditionally define the legal parameters of the just compensation issue:
(1) whether or not the public or its agents have physically used or
occupied the claimant's property; 5° (2) the size of the harm the claimant
sustained or the degree to which affected property has been devalued; 51
(3) whether the claimant's loss is or is not outweighed by the public's
concomitant gain; 52 and (4) whether the claimant has sustained any
loss apart from a restriction of his liberty to conduct some activity
considered harmful to other people. Michelman questions the value
of any of these approaches in coming to grips with the compensation
problem. He believes all of them evade the fairness question in some
circumstances and, therefore, are not good measures of equity by
themselves.- '
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

This scenario relates to the Greenbelt Proposal, §§ I & III.
See supra note 10.
Sax, Takings, PrivatePropertyand PublicRights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 149-186 (1971).
See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 2.
Michelnan, supra note 10, at 1184, 1226.
Id. at 1190, 1229.
Id. at 1193, 1234.
Id. at 1197, 1235.
See id. at 1245.
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The principal issues are whether the government's exercise of its
takings authority is legitimate and whether or not compensation is
equitable. Analyzing these issues is perhaps the most difficult problem
that law and economics theorists confront because placing numerical
values on costs and benefits is necessarily subjective. Economists have,
however, developed mathematical relationships represented by series
of equations and tests that determine whether a taking is justified or
if sufficient compensation has been paid.
Michelman has developed a formula to determine whether a governmental project should not be undertaken:(1) B-(C + D) < 0
(2) B-(C + S) <0
where
B = the project's benefits
D = demoralization costs
S = settlement costs (transactions costs)
C = all project costs other than S or D
Demoralization costs are the "total of (a) the dollar value necessary
to offset disutilities which accrue to losers and their sympathizers
specifically from the realization that no compensation is offered and
(b) the present capitalized dollar value of lost future production" demoralization causes.M Settlement costs "are the dollar value of the
time, effort, and resources which would be required in order to reach
' 57
compensation settlements adequate to avoid demoralization costs.
Michelman states that a project should be rejected if both conditions
(1) and (2) are met. For instance, the county's decision to build the
park is legitimate only if the benefits (B) are large enough to offset
project costs (C) plus the costs of infringing on Mossbacks's and others'
rights to enjoy their property (D), and, the benefits (B) must exceed
the sum of project costs (C) and settlement costs (S). The public
project should not be undertaken if B is less than the sum of either
C and D or C and S.
55. This type of approach is also suggested in B. ACKERMAN, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS
OF PROPERTY LAW 144-46 (1975).
56. Michelman, supra note 10, at 1182, 1218. Demoralization costs include the disutility of
observers who are disturbed by the thought that they may someday be subject to similar
treatment. Id. If Mossback purchased his land long before the development of a proposed
Alachua County greenbelt plan so that his subjective expectation was the government would
not take his property or restrict its development, his demoralization costs may be quite high.
If Mossback expected otherwise, his personal demoralization costs would be much lower.
57. Id.
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In an ideal world where there is no misrepresentation of individuals'
demoralization costs, each individual should receive whichever of the
two costs is greater. For example, if demoralization costs are greater,
Mossback should receive additional compensation beyond the standard
settlement payment so the total amount he receives is equal to his
demoralization costs. In a more realistic world, individuals act opportunistically and overstate their personal costs to maximize the payments received from the County. These activities are referred to as
"hold-outs" and lead to demoralization costs that increase when settlement costs decrease or when the property-owner realizes he is unlikely
to gain from future government takings.
The actual level of compensation paid to Mossback is contingent
on Mossback's role in the transaction. If the land is actually worth
very little to Mossback, regardless of its external assessment, then
Mossback's effort to hold-out would bring about a classic bilateral
monopoly problem. 58 This situation occurs when two parties are
59
negotiating over property in which they both have some rights.
Mossback has a great incentive to lie about his internal valuation of
the property and overstate his attachment to the property. He will
try to hold-out for as long as possible to improve his negotiation
posture and raise the County's settlement offer.
As a policy matter, it is unlikely that courts will give Mossback
expectational damages if he claims he intended to devote his land for
future commercial use particularly when the property is already zoned
at the lowest taxable rate (the rural zone).- Law and economics
theorists would argue that this judicial reluctance results in an efficient
outcome because Mossback's incentive to litigate declines. The economically efficient outcome occurs because the court will only consider the
property's market price proportional to its current development usage.
Mossback, however, may value the property more because of emotional
attachment than the compensation the county offers. For instance, if
Mossback were an elderly retiree who had lived for many years on
the property that was about to be taken, he could ask a Court for an
expectational damage remedy to displace his demoralization costs. In
this situation, the court may consider both interests, economic efficiency and equity, in reaching as decision.

58. See R.
59.
60.
MENT

POSNER, supra note 3, at 49.
Id. at 54-57.
See D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER,
CONTROL LAW § 20.12 (2d ed. 1986).
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Michelman would agree with the taking if the park benefitted the
6 1
least-advantaged members of society over the most highly endowed.
Michelman's primary test of whether or not compensation is appropriate is ultimately based on calculations of fairness rather than whether
the park itself is efficient for society. Joseph Sax, however, would
argue that the taking should occur. Sax argues that the great danger
of compensating landowners such as Mossback is that the government
may forego socially useful legislation because of a fear of runaway
settlement costs even if the project remains efficient for society. Sax,
therefore, feels that compensation for takings is not necessary even
in cases of physical invasion as long as the proposed land use is for
a clear public purpose.6
Sax, however, might say that using the land as a greenbelt does
not serve a clear public purpose.63 Sax distinguishes between instances
where the government mediates between parties and where the government acts as an enterprise.6 In the former, Sax argues that a
broad conception of "public rights" provides the basis for a non-compensable use of the police power when the government is acting as a
non-governmental mediator between property owners.65 In the latter,
he urges that governments acting on their own behalf are enterprises
and must compensate under the takings provision. 6
On the other end of the spectrum from Sax, Epstein argues that
almost all regulation without compensation leads to inefficiency.67 Epstein's views place him furthest from those who believe that governments can act in socially useful ways in land-use disputes. He states
that the role of government in taking property is "to generate a public
good, some nonexclusive benefit, that a private market cannot generate." He also supports judicial actions to dismantle much of existing
land use regulation.6
See Michelman, supra note 10, at 1181, 1218. See also J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
(1971).
62. See Sax, supra note 48, at 149-86. What constitutes a public purpose is a matter of
considerable debate. See Paul, Public Use: A Vanishing Limitation on Governmental Takings,
4 CATO J. 835 (1985) (Supreme Court has "all but buried" the public use restraint).
63. This approach is more difficult to support if the park's specific usage is for lower-income
residents because some law and economics theorists argue that the law should promote redistributional goals.
64. See Sax, supra note 48, at 150-51.
65. One example is where the government acts as a regional planning board.
66. See Sax, supra note 48, at 150-51.
67. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 2. Notable is the author's lack of empirical evidence to
support his position.
68. Epstein, JudicialReview: Reckoning on Two Types ofError,4 CATO J. 711, 715 (1985).
69. See generally R. EPSTEIN, supra note 2 (arguing that judiciary inadequately protects
economic liberties). Epstein argues that when the state infringes on personal liberties and
61.
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Law and economics theorists differ in their perspectives regarding
how a court should decide Mossback's case. Nonetheless, it is likely
that all three would favor the project if efficiency and equity criteria
were met. Michelman and Epstein, however, would be very concerned
about the extent of governmental intrusion. All three theorists would
compensate Mossback for his loss because the County is acting as an
enterprise rather than a mediator. Michelman, in particular, is concerned with a stable set of expectations regarding property rights.
He would support Mossback's compensation claim particularly if
Mossback purchased the land before the development plans were announced. If the net aggregate benefits of the County's proposed land
use plan exceeded the net aggregate costs, however, Michelman would
not support compensation for Mossback.
B.

Situation B

-

Regulatory Takings & The Nexus Test

Mossback also owns a piece of property in the rural zone
and wants to reconstruct a house that recently burned. The
house was on a one acre piece of property. Unfortunately,
the County's recently enacted Greenbelt Proposal prohibits
Mossback from constructing more than one residence per
five acre tract in the rural zone. The County, however, will
permit Mossback to rebuild the house if he agrees to grant
a right of public access across his property to a county-owned
lakeside park. The park currently has no access road and
the shortest and most economically efficient access would be
across Mossback's property. Mossback refuses to grant public
access and sues again.7This hypothetical involves two interrelated issues. The first is
whether Mossback can recover compensation under a regulatory taking
theory if the Greenbelt Proposal's minimum lot size requirement reduces the value of his property. 71 The second is whether the County's
contingent rebuilding offer offends either efficiency or equity criteria.
This section analyzes these and other issues.
private property it must provide just compensation. He distinguishes his approach from judicial
activism, which he deplores, by arguing that he is merely advocating a 'principled account of
both the functions of the state and the limitations upon its powers" within a fifth amendment
framework. See Low, Property Oumers Get More Shelter, INSIGHT, Sept. 28, 1987, at 8-14.
70. This scenario could arise in any of the zones although it would be most likely to arise
in the rural or the Greenbelt zones.
71. The loss in property value refers to Mossback's loss of value in his land. Mossback's
loss due to the fire that destroyed his house is not compensable under eminent domain (i.e. the
County's restrictions are unrelated to this loss). Instead, Mossback would seek recovery from
his insurance company for fire-related losses.
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1. Regulatory Takings
The law of regulatory takings is inconsistent and currently in a
transitory state. The general rule is that a regulatory taking does not
occur unless a property owner loses all or nearly all economically
viable use of his property. 72 If a regulation goes "too far," a taking
occurs.73 Courts that have applied this "too far" test have indicated
that the percentage of diminution of value must approach one-hundred
percent before a taking occurs. 74 In Mossback's case, the closer his
losses approach one-hundred percent, the stronger his claim for compensation (provided the County prevents him from rebuilding). Assuming Mossback's loss of property value is over ninety percent, he has
suffered a significant loss. Smaller percentage losses are generally not
compensable.
The hypothetical, although not completely analogous, is similar to
a recent United States Supreme Court decision. 75 In First English
Evangelical Lutheran Churchv. County of Los Angeles 7 6 the Supreme
Court ruled 6-3, with Justice Rehnquist writing the majority opinion,
that the church has a right to compensation for a temporary regulatory
taking 7v A 1978 flood had devastated part of the church's property.
The following year the county passed an ordinance prohibiting the
church from rebuilding on the land. The Court held that if the regulation denies the church all use of this land, the regulation constitutes
a taking. The church would be entitled to damages from the date the
ordinance initially became effective.
This ruling indicates that local governments are somewhat restricted in regulating property rights through their police powers. For
instance, a county may have to provide compensation if one of its land
use ordinances denies a property owner all economically viable use of
the affected property. Consequently, local governments will more carefully consider future land use restrictions.
72. See D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 24.5 (prac. ed. 1986). The authors state that "it is difficult to find any

case that has actually sustained a taking claim based solely on an alleged deprivation of all
economic use." Id.
73. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922).
74. The United States Supreme Court has rejected a number of takings claims where the
diminution of property value exceeded 75%. See Simon, The Supreme Court's 1987 "Takings"
Triad: An Old Hat in a New Box or a Revolution in Takings Law?, 1 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y, 103, 114 n.105 (1987) (citing cases).
75. The hypothetical is also similar to another recent Supreme Court case, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987), which is discussed in the last section. See infra
notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
76. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987)
77. For a more in-depth analysis of this case see Simon, supra note 74, at 124-27.
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Mossback's situation is paradoxical because the net effects of the
County's restrictions are indeterminate: Mossback incurs both costs
and benefits.78 He incurs significant costs because the County will not
allow him to rebuild this home because it is now a nonconforming
use. 79 This restriction reduces Mossback's enjoyment of his land as
much if not more than if the County had physically taken it. In addition, allowing Mossback to rebuild might diminish the Greenbelt Proposal's goal of maintaining the rural character of the land. Mossback,
however, may benefit both in emotional and financial terms because
of the new rural zone classification. For instance, a rural classification
that similarly restricts Mossback's neighbors from developing their
land may actually raise the value of Mossback's property. Thus, his
situation provides a test of how broader social interests are balanced
with an individual's exercise of economic liberties.
Economic analysis of the seemingly harsh legal rule against compensation for regulatory takings provides some interesting insights.
Posner identifies a number of reasons why courts permit regulatory
takings without compensation. First, the transactions costs of negotiat-80
ing with each affected property owner may be inordinately high.
Posner, however, limits this rationale to situations where the exercise
of eminent domain eliminates the bilateral monopoly problem., Second,
in low transaction costs situations, regulatory takings are simply a
substitute for taxation. The affected property owners suffer diminution
of their property values (i.e. a tax), the magnitude and incidence of
which is difficult to predict.- Finally, the requirement of just compensation limits governmental use of its eminent domain power.8 The

78. The paradox occurs because the minimum lot regulation initially operates as a shield
protecting Mossback from other property owners dimishing the rural character of the zone but, after the fire, this same shield operates to deprive Mossback of the regulation's benefits.
79. The law regarding non-conforming uses is important in this situation. D. HAGMAN &
J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 60, at 114-129. "[N]early all ordinances provide that a use
may continue if it lawfully preexists the adoption of the zoning ordinance, though it would be
unlawful if the use were established after the passage of the ordinance." Id. at 114. The authors
also note that "[many ordinances provide that if the nonconforming building is substantially
destroyed [by an Act of God], it cannot be rebuilt . . . . Such an ordinance might be held
unconstitutional as applied, and the courts are somewhat sympathetic to the owners as as not
to compound their calamities." Id. at 120.
80. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 53. He states "[ilmagine the difficulties involved in
identifying, and then transacting with, everyone whose property values were raised or lowered
Id.
...
by governmental regulation.
81. Id. at 48-49.
82. Id. at 50. Posner notes that this type of "tax" may actually be efficient because the
regulation may not affect individuals' behavior significantly. Id.
83. Id. at 51.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 1

legal rule regarding regulatory takings, therefore, increases the incentive for the government to use its police power rather than its eminent
domain power. Exercise of the police power is much less likely to
result in liability compared with the exercise of eminent domain powers.
A number of general economic principles have developed regarding
the legitimacy and efficiency of takings. For instance, Michelman states
that takings, whether by physical invasion or regulation, are often
considered appropriate when they have a general and apparent equalizing effect which benefits those who are worse off at the expense of
those who are better off.m In Mossback's situation, most law and
economic theorists would favor compensation on equity as well as
efficiency grounds. The primary argument for efficiency is that compensation would limit the County's efforts to over regulate property
use. Similarly, a judicial rule cutting off compensation at ninety percent
rather than say fifty percent is arbitrary because in either case the
affected landowner suffers a loss. The primary equity argument is
that shifting this loss to private individuals who suffer an almost total
taking is unfair.
One argument against Mossback's compensation claim is based on
the idea that social gains should be balanced against private losses.
This argument presumes that the net result of a taking is that everyone
will be at least as well off as before the taking, while at least some
people are better off. This pareto efficiency argument is thought-provoking, particularly in this situation, because county residents in the
rural zone who are not using the land for commercial speculation
benefit from the rural downzoning. These rural residents benefit from
lower tax rates, and, over the long run, a higher value for their homes
as the right to build becomes scarce. Mossback's personal loss may
be necessary to achieve these widespread gains, particularly where
the transactions costs of negotiation are high.
Another issue is whether Mossback should receive compensation
if, for example, he is a wealthy landowner with many rural parcels
of property. A court may rule that Mossback should not expect compensation if the percentage reduction in the total value of all his land
holdings is small despite losing the entire value of a single tract. The
explicit value in this case is equitable income distribution. Notably,
some courts are tending to adopt this "deep pocket" approach to regulatory takings.8
84. See Michelman, supra note 10, at 1182, 1218.
85. This assertion is particularly true where the affected property receives few benefits
from the Greenbelt Proposal.
86. See Simon, supra note 74, at 110 n.71.
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In general, economists would permit Mossback to rebuild his house
if efficiency and equity criteria are met. The argument for rebuilding
is that the rural character of the land remains unchanged; in fact, not
allowing Mossback to rebuild would have serious consequences. First,
Mossback's and other similarly situated resident's demoralization costs
may be quite high.8 Second, Mossback's and others' inability to rebuild
reduces the demand for services such as electricity, police and fire
protection, etc., which in turn may cause diseconomies of scale. The
counter argument is that permitting Mossback to rebuild might increase the demand and costs of providing these services in excess of
what the County had contemplated.
2. The Nexus Test
This hypothetical is similar to another recent United States Supreme Court case. In Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission,- the
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 majority decision written by Justice Antonin
Scalia, ruled that a regulation can constitute a compensable taking of
property if it is unrelated to the regulation's stated goal. 9 The Nollans
had requested that they be allowed to build a larger home on their
beachfront property. The Coastal Commission, however, conditioned
issuance of a building permit on the Nollans granting a public right-ofway across their property to the beach. The Court held that the
Coastal Commission's requirement of beach access constituted a taking
of the Nollans' property requiring compensation. The Court stated
that there must be a nexus (clear connection) between the concession
and the reason the government wishes to restrain or prohibit development. The Commission's asserted purpose in prohibiting expansive
construction was to preserve the public's view of the beach from the
roadway - a goal which public access across the Nollans' property
would not further.
The decision is important because it requires government land use
planners to separate the use of their eminent domain powers from
their regulatory police powers. For example, the Court stated the
Coastal Commission could not force the Nollans to grant public access
without compensation. The Commission could, however, prohibit the
Nollans from building a structure that interfered with the public's
view of the beach. Thus, the Nollan decision sets a basis for attacks

87. Property owners whose homesteads do not exceed the five acre minimum would fear
that they could suffer the same fate as Mossback.
88. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
89. For an in-depth analysis of this case see Simon, supra note 74, at 127-31.
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on linkage requirements and development fees which combine these
two powers 0
Mossback's situation here is distinguishable from the first hypothetical because the County is operating as a mediator rather than as an
enterprise. The County's exercise of its police power to create the
greenbelt operates to settle conflicts between nongovernmental property owners over the use of affected property. In Mossback's case,
the legal issue is whether requiring access to the park furthers the
Greenbelt Proposal's goal of maintaining the rural character of the
land. The nexus argument is difficult in this situation because public
access allows individuals to enjoy the rural character of the park. The
economic issue is whether this type of bargaining between the government and property owners promotes efficiency or is equitable.
An anomalous result of the Nollan decision is that the range of
potential "bargains" that property owners can negotiate with land use
officials becomes more limited. For instance, under different circumstances the Nollans may have decided that they were better off
with a larger home but with a public accessway across their property.
The Nollan decision eliminates this possibility. In Mossback's situation, the same principle applies. The ability of the County to provide
what it considers the best combination of public access and rural character is limited. Instead of the County bargaining with Mossback, the
County will simply have to exercise its eminent domain powers to
physically take the right-of-way for access. In actuality, the County
may simply decide to take the property and provide compensation
without granting Mossback rebuilding rights. Whether this outcome
is either efficient or equitable is questionable.
The rebuttal against this "restricted bargaining" argument is that
the Nollan decision restrains the government from using its regulatory
takings power as a fulcrum to force, property owners to accede to
physical takings. In other words, the government cannot use its considerable regulatory takings power to extort landowners into relinquishing their property rights without providing compensation. Suppose that Mossback suffers a fifty percent reduction in his property's
value after the Greenbelt Proposal takes effect. The County then
grants him rebuilding rights but takes a public right of access.
Mossback's property rebounds to its previous value (less the value of
the accessway) and the County's residents now have the preferred

90. See Quinn, Incluionary Zoning and Linkage: Land Use Planning Techniques in an
Age of Scarce Public Resources, 1 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 21 (1987) (examination of
linkage and the rational nexus test).
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access route to the park. This outcome may be both efficient and
equitable - but it is unconstitutional. Nollan, therefore, may actually
prevent Mossback from recovering part of the value of his property
lost under the regulatory taking.
V.

CONCLUSION

The hypothetical situations in this essay are, of course, not exhaustive. They demonstrate, however, that applications of law and
economics theory fundamentally alter the debate on property rights.
The apparent trend towards incorporating law and economics reasoning in judicial decision-making indicates that an Alachua County greenbelt plan faces possibly rigorous legal and economic hurdles. Any
greenbelt plan that significantly alters existing property rights through
physical takings or zoning changes will cause a significant amount of
litigation.
In the development of property rights theory, the law and
economics theorists are making important contributions. Like their
predecessors, they continue to redefine the parameters of the public
good: justice. In so doing they have helped make property law a
vibrant and intellectually challenging area of legal argument. The law
and economics school offers a unique approach that illuminates previously obscured perspectives. This approach does not, however, result
in one precise answer to property rights issues primarily because of
the ongoing conflict between efficiency and equity in legal decisionmaking. The policy applications in this paper demonstrates there is
considerable room for disagreement on the "best" solution among law
and economics scholars.
APPENDIX
I.

HALL GREENBELT PROPOSAL
Establish an urban defining limit between San Felasco Hammock
State Preserve and Kanapaha Prairie.
A. Limit is determined by the ultimate amount of population
inside the urban Gainesville limits. This figure should be
based on:
1. ultimate urban Gainesville population based on average
current residential densities.
2. efficient ultimate utility extensions.
a. utility limits should be contained in right-of-ways
for multi-use capabilities.
b. urban limit should extend from the utility limits in
a natural and efficient manner.
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Establish the urban limit as a swath of land in the new
proposed Greenbelt zone land classification.
1. Greenbelt zone location is influenced by large vacant
tracts of land. These should be included inside the area
of the Greenbelt zone.
2. Greenbelt zone should be beyond the current 31 point
residential density contour to insure that no property
rights are compromised and to allow for the ultimate
full growth of the urban zone.
3. Inside the Greenbelt zone and the already identified
ecosystems that define the south, east, and north limits
of Gainesville's urban limit will be the urban zone.
C. Urban defining limit should be a permanent line beyond
which all property will be in a rural land use classification.
D. Densities should be increased inside the urban defining limit
in the urban zone; specifically in and around the current
activity centers.
E. The entire area inside the urban defining limits (the urban
zone) should eventually be incorporated into one municipality.
F. Development may occur in the Greenbelt zone as is currently permitted at 1 dwelling unit per acre if the new
requirements are met. This allows property owners to retain their current development rights or increase them if
the cluster development which would allow more dwelling
units but at the same time preserve the rural character of
the land.
II. Establish a rural land use classification.
A. Rural residential densities will be 1 dwelling unit per 5
acres.
B. Rural subdivisions will incur proper open space to the rural
character of the land.
C. Cluster rural subdivisions will allow 1 dwelling unit per
acre if the special and stringent design requirements are
met. This will relieve loss of property rights from the loss
of development rights associated with the reduction of allowable density in the rural area.
1. dwelling units are clustered in up to 5 unit groups.
2. each cluster is surrounded by open space.
3. septic systems are arrayed away from the clusters in
the open space.
4. deep setbacks are required from any public right of way.
D. Higher levels of service are implemented in rural areas.
This reduces future density capacity by causing any prop-
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III.

osed development to bear an even heavier burden of the
infrastructure costs.
Establish a Greenbelt cluster zone. This area will act as the
physical Greenbelt connection between San Felasco and
Kanapaha Prairie. This area will be the transition between the
urban and the rural areas. Because it is at the periphery of the
utility extensions, residential densities will be relatively low in
comparison to urban densities. The allowable density will, however, be relatively higher than proposed rural densities. The
main feature of this zone is to allow the land to remain in rural
character. The rural character can be preserved by requiring
deep setbacks form public rights of way and high percentages
of mandatory, undeveloped open spaces. This can be accomplished by stringent cluster subdivision codes that guide
development safely and efficiently.
A. This area will be the urban limit to the City of Gainesville.
B. This area will be the furthest extension of utilities into the
County from Gainesville.
C. Utility extensions from the main lines in the multi-purpose
rights of way will be the developer's responsibility unless
in case of hardship.
D. Density will be based on the Future Land Use 2000 density
checklist. Any infrastructure extensions done by the developer will count toward extra allowable density.
E. Open space is required to surround the residential
clusters.
F. Deep setbacks are required from all public rights of way.
G. Additional density should be allowed if certain additional
design criteria are met:
1. additional percentages of open space are provided.
2. public access is allowed to the open space.
3. part of the land is put into a long term contract for
agricultural use.
4. part of the land is reforested.

